Plessy v. Ferguson, was decided in May of 1896, by a vote of seven to one. It held that the State of Louisiana could lawfully require railroads to provide what the statute called “equal but separate accommodations” for white and Black people, and that a passenger who refused to sit in the car assigned to their race could be prosecuted as a criminal. Plessy is the decision most Americans associate with the phrase “separate but equal,” and it is the subject of this episode in our series on Supreme Court Cases that Sucked. 

Transcript for: Plessy v. Ferguson and the Long Road to Equal

On the twelfth of October, 1838, the Salem Gazette ran a short item about two white sailors on the newly opened Eastern Railroad, the line that carried passengers between Boston and Salem, Massachusetts. The sailors had been drinking, and their behavior was offensive enough to the other passengers that the conductor removed them from the train car they were riding in. The newspaper described where they were sent in blunt terms. It was the car set aside for undesirable passengers, and the Gazette gave it a name that its readers evidently understood without further explanation: the Jim Crow car.

The railroad had been in operation for scarcely a month. There was no statute requiring anyone to sit anywhere. The separation of Black passengers from white ones on the Eastern Railroad was a matter of company policy, decided by the railroad’s managers from its first day of service, and it was a policy that only three of the eight passenger railroads then operating in Massachusetts had chosen to adopt. The phrase Jim Crow would later name an entire legal and social order in the American South yet it appears here, in print, in a New England newspaper, more than half a century before the Supreme Court of the United States decided the segregation case we are discussing today.

That case, Plessy v. Ferguson, was decided in May of 1896, by a vote of seven to one. It held that the State of Louisiana could lawfully require railroads to provide what the statute called “equal but separate accommodations” for white and Black people, and that a passenger who refused to sit in the car assigned to their race could be prosecuted as a criminal. Plessy is the decision most Americans associate with the phrase “separate but equal,” and it is the subject of this episode in our series on Supreme Court Cases that Sucked. 

I’m Elizabeth

And I’m Sarah

And we are your historians for this episode of Dig.

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Elizabeth:  Today we are taking on an awful Supreme Court decision, Plessy v. Ferguson. Many of you probably know the basics of the case. There was a Louisiana law segregating railroad cars, a person of color, Homer Plessy, was arrested for sitting in the white car, and the Supreme Court that upheld the Louisiana law, basically establishing the doctrine of separate but equal until Brown v. Board of Education overturned it in 1954. So that’s the simple version, but if you’ve picked up on anything from our podcast dear listener, you know that nothing is ever that straightforward. 

Sarah: We are hoping to complicate that simple picture a bit. The case did not begin in Louisiana in 1892. Its roots run back to the 1830s, and its legal reasoning was assembled out of decades of state court decisions, many of them written by Northern judges. We also want to highlight the long record of resistance by Black Americans, and by some white allies, who contested separation in trains, streetcars, steamboats, and courtrooms for sixty years before Homer Plessy ever bought his train ticket.

Elizabeth: This episode draws on Steve Luxenberg’s 2019 book Separate: The Story of Plessy v. Ferguson, and America’s Journey from Slavery to Segregation. Luxenberg’s book focuses on the legal precedents the Plessy majority chose to cite, taking a selection of the cases that Justice Henry Billings Brown relied on for the majority opinion and explores the stories behind those earlier cases. I’ve also consulted scholarship by Keith Weldon Medley, Williamjames Hull Hoffer, Mark Elliot, and Barbara L. Grahm. Also, we will be quoting directly from the published opinions, including the majority opinion and dissent in Plessy, as well as other related court cases.

Sarah: We should also say a word about language. Nineteenth-century Americans did not generally speak about “segregation,” they instead used the word “seperation.” In court opinions and most discussions or opinions in print, the word commonly used was “separate,” with the Louisiana statute at the heart of Plessy speaking of “equal but separate accommodations.” So, we will mostly use the word separation when we are describing the nineteenth century and reserve the word segregation for the twentieth-century system that grew out of the decision in Plessy.

Elizabeth: Something else to be aware of. Modern listeners might understand the Fourteenth Amendment through an expansive interpretation, with its guarantees of due process and equal protection applied broadly to questions of race, but that only came about in the second half of the twentieth century. The Supreme Court of the 1890s did not read the amendment that way. We go into that a bit more in depth in one of our older episodes, titled (shockingly) The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. We’ll link it in our show notes, or you can just search our back catalogue if you want to know more about that. 

Sarah: Often when students think of “the civil rights movement,” they think of the 1950s and 1960s sit-ins, marches, and the police dogs and fire hoses of Birmingham, Alabama. But it’s important to understand that the civil rights movement has much deeper roots flowing all the way back to the nation’s founding. In the 1860s and 1870s after the American Civil War, there was a bright period of time when the federal government was serious about rectifying some of the wrongs it had perpetrated. During this time, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, and a series of federal civil rights statutes were passed and put into effect. In some ways, this was a revolution. The Constitution had originally accommodated slavery, most visibly in the three-fifths clause, which counted three of every five enslaved persons for the purpose of apportioning seats in the House of Representatives. The Reconstruction amendments overturned that accommodation. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery. The Fourteenth established birthright citizenship and guaranteed due process and the equal protection of the laws. And the Fifteenth prohibited the denial of the vote on account of race, though the gender barrier was left in place.

Elizabeth: This is why Sarah and I geek out about the Reconstruction Era- because it was this point in our history that held so much promise. There are so many what ifs? What if the 40 acres and a mule policy would have been enacted for all those formerly enslaved, what if the original intentions of the Reconstruction Amendments weren’t chipped away through court decisions that narrowed their protections to a sliver. What if laws and loopholes created to get around them weren’t upheld in court? Reconstruction was a time when you had Black Congressmen, a Black governor in Louisiana, Black males voting in record numbers. But that’s all shut down by the end of the nineteenth century, and Plessy v. Ferguson is one of the bookends closing off that constitutional revolution at least until the mid-twentieth century. In order to understand the 1896 Plessy ruling we need to look back at legal precedent and social norms well before the Civil War.  

This commemorative lithograph depicts the African American men elected to public office in 1868.  HNOC, 1979.183

Sarah: The phrase “Jim Crow” was familiar to New England readers of the Salem Gazette in 1838 because of the enormous popularity of blackface minstrelsy. The most famous of the minstrel performers was Thomas Dartmouth Rice who built his career on a song-and-dance routine called “Jump Jim Crow,” in which a white performer in blackface caricatured a Black man. In the 1830s it was a huge commercial success, with Jim Crow figurines for sale at state fairs. After a successful European tour by Rice, a racehorse named Jim Crow won a stakes race in Ireland. The phrase “jumping Jim Crow” even entered political language as a synonym for what we would now call flip-flopping and was applied to politicians who could not hold a consistent position. So, when the Massachusetts Salem Gazette mentioned the Jim Crow car, its readers knew exactly what that meant; it was a car set aside for Black passengers.  

Elizabeth: In the late 1830s, free people of color made up roughly one percent of the population of Massachusetts. In the slaveholding states, the idea of a separate railroad car for Black people was not something white Southerners needed to contemplate. If Black people were traveling, they were doing it while enslaved and usually in the company of those who claimed to own them. Free Black people wouldn’t travel in the South because they could get kidnapped, like Soloman Northrup was in Twelve Years a Slave. It was in the North that the question of where a free Black passenger would sit became a live issue and the railroad sharpened that question in a way that earlier forms of transportation had not. A stagecoach carried a handful of passengers; a traveler on horseback carried only himself. A railroad car brought together a much larger and less selected body of people, increasing anxiety about racial mixing in train cars. 

Sarah: In eastern Massachusetts some of the most radical political activists of the age, the abolitionists, were riding those train cars. For years they had traveled to evening antislavery society meetings across the region on horseback and they welcomed the railroad as an improvement over riding through the New England weather at night. They frequently traveled the trains in pairs, sometimes one white and one Black, and they began to challenge the separate-car policies of the railroads directly, which brought them into repeated confrontation with train conductors.

Elizabeth: One of those Black abolitionists was a twenty-something Frederick Douglass, who had escaped from slavery in Maryland only a few years earlier. In his autobiography, Douglass recounted a time when he refused to leave his seat in the white rail car. When several men attempted to physically remove him, he gripped the seat so hard that it was torn from its fastenings. 

black and white picture of a man
Frederick Douglass in the 1840s

Sarah: David Ruggles, another Black abolitionist from New York, was forcefully removed from a train while visiting Massachusetts. Ruggles was a small man who had cataracts that left him nearly blind. When he was thrown off a train on the New Bedford and Taunton line, south of Boston, he was bruised and his clothing was torn. Ruggles brought assault charges against the conductor in the New Bedford police court. 

Elizabeth: Massachusetts abolitionists petitioned the state legislature for a law prohibiting separate cars. That effort failed, but by 1843 the railroads had voluntarily abandoned the practice under pressure applied in the legislature by Charles Francis Adams, the son of President John Quincy Adams and the grandson of John Adams. But separation on Massachusetts railroads had never been a matter of overturning a law; separation had been a matter of business. 

Sarah: Separation did not disappear from the North. An 1858 Michigan case, Day v. Owen, involved transportation on a steamboat and later appeared among the precedents cited in Plessy. So would a Massachusetts decision from outside the transportation context: Roberts v. City of Boston, decided in 1849, in which Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld the authority of the Boston school committee to maintain a separate primary school for Black children. The plaintiff was a five-year-old girl named Sarah Roberts, and her lawyer was Charles Sumner, later one of the leading Radical Republicans in the United States Senate. The Massachusetts legislature prohibited separate schools by law in 1855, but Shaw’s reasoning survived the statute that superseded it, and Justice Henry Billings Brown would cite the Roberts case in his majority opinion for Plessy as evidence that separate schools had been upheld “even by courts of States where the political rights of the colored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced.”[1]

Elizabeth: In January 1865, while the Civil War was still being fought and the Thirteenth Amendment was moving through Congress toward ratification, a committee of sixty-nine white Philadelphians organized in order to pressure streetcar companies to admit Black passengers to the interior of their cars. Philadelphia in the 1860s was undergoing a railroad and trolly boom. There were nineteen streetcar companies in the city, carrying roughly fifty thousand passengers a day, in a city whose population was growing from roughly 565,000 in 1860 to roughly 674,000 in 1870. About four percent of Philadelphians were people of color, the highest proportion of any major city in the free North. The streetcar companies generally refused to allow Black passengers to ride inside their cars. Those who rode at all were required to stand on the outside platforms, whatever the weather. During the war, this policy applied to Black soldiers in the uniform of the Union army, a circumstance that many white Philadelphians found increasingly difficult to defend.

Sarah: The committee met with the railway presidents, and the parties agreed to a deal, where the passengers would vote. The companies printed ballots, advertised a two-day poll in the newspapers, and distributed the ballots to riders. They distributed them, however, only to white passengers, and the white passengers voted to continue the existing arrangement. The companies reported that they regretted the outcome but would abide by the preference of their customers. The streetcar campaign in Philadelphia was then pushed forward by Black activists, most prominently Octavius Catto. Catto was an educator and an early civil rights activist in Philadelphia. Here’s a little snippet about one of Catto’s actions to desegregate the trolley cars found in the New York Times:

Last evening a colored man got into a Pine-street passenger car, and refused all entreaties to leave the car, where his presence appeared to be not desired.

The conductor of the car, fearful of being fined for ejecting him, as was done by the Judges of one of our courts in a similar case, ran the car off the track, detached the horses, and left the colored man to occupy the car all by himself.

The colored man still firmly maintains his position in the car, having spent the whole of the night there.

The conductor looks upon the part he enacted in the affair as a splendid piece of strategy.

The matter creates quite a sensation in the neighborhood where the car is standing, and crowds of sympathizers flock around the colored man.[2]

Elizabeth: Mary Miles, a Black schoolteacher living in the suburbs of Philadelphia brought a case against a suburban rail line, the West Chester and Philadelphia Railroad. She boarded the train and declined to move from the car reserved for white passengers when asked. She was physically removed from the train at a platform far from any town and had to walk about ten miles to get home. That experience led her to hire a white Philadelphia lawyer, George Earle, who came from a family with deep roots in the abolitionist movement. Earle and his law partner won her case in the trial court but the railroad appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which heard arguments on the West Chester and Philadelphia Railroad Co. v. Miles case in April, 1867.

Sarah: For a while the timing appeared to favor Miles because the Pennsylvania legislature had recently passed a law guaranteeing equal access to public conveyances. Of the five justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, three were Republicans, members of the party founded in 1854 to oppose the extension of slavery. The court could have disposed of the case narrowly, noting that the legislature’s new law guaranteeing equal access to public conveyances had altered the legal landscape. Instead, the court reversed the lower court’s judgment in Miles’s, by a vote of four to one. The single dissenting justice recorded his dissent without writing an opinion, so we do not know his reasoning.

Elizabeth: Justice Daniel Agnew, a Republican, wrote an opinion for the majority in the Miles case that opined on the wisdom and legality of separation. Agnew’s opinion asserted what may have been the first explicit declaration of a “right to separate” in Pennsylvania law, and he offered a variety of justifications for it. Chief among them was the prevention of violence. Agnew wrote:

The law cannot repress the anger, or conquer the aversion which some will feel. However unwise it may be to indulge the feeling, it is much wiser to avert the consequences of this repulsion of race by separation, than to punish afterward the breach of the peace it may have caused.[3]

A railroad rule separating passengers, Agnew reasoned, was a reasonable means “to preserve order and decorum, and to prevent contacts and collisions arising from natural or well-known customary repugnancies, which are likely to breed disturbances by a promiscuous sitting.”[4]

Sarah: Agnew then turned from public order to theology. The Creator, he wrote, had ordained separation by making the races so dissimilar. And he offered a reassurance that would echo, nearly three decades later, in the Plessy majority opinion:

To assert separateness is not to declare inferiority in either. It is not to declare one a slave and the other a freeman… It is simply to say that following the order of Divine Providence, human authority ought not to compel these widely separated races to intermix.[5]

Agnew went on to describe the separation of the races as the existing condition of Pennsylvania society. Black Pennsylvanians, he observed, lived apart, visited and entertained among themselves, occupied separate places of worship and amusement, and filled no civil or political stations. He presented these exclusions as a natural and voluntary social arrangement, when in actuality that separation was produced and enforced by law and custom.

Elizabeth: Mary Miles lost her case after the Civil War, in a Northern court, before a Republican majority, in the same year that her state’s legislature prohibited the separation of races on public conveyances. Insidiously, the decision’s longer significance is that Justice Brown cited it in the 1896 Plessy case as a precedent for the reasonableness of separation. The language of public order and police power that Agnew used in 1867 is the same language on which the Plessy majority ultimately rested its decision.

Sarah: The Civil War and the constitutional changes that followed it altered the legal landscape. Before the war, in the 1857 Dred Scott v. Sandford case, Chief Justice Roger Taney declared that Black Americans, whether enslaved or free, were not and could not become citizens of the United States. So, when legislators crafted the Fourteenth Amendment, they deliberately set out to reverse Dred Scott, by proclaiming all persons born or naturalized in the United States citizens of the nation and of the state in which they reside are protected by the Amendment.

Elizabeth: Reconstruction was a time of great possibilities, but also of maintaining the status quo. Many white Southerners reacted with fear and violence. The economic basis of the planter class had been destroyed and former high-ranking Confederate officers and officials were temporarily barred from voting and officeholding. There was a conviction among many white Southerners that the political power that was rightfully theirs was being taken from them by people they regarded as their inferiors. White terrorist organizations like the Ku Klux Klan, founded in Tennessee in the immediate aftermath of the war, spread rapidly through the South. However, by 1877 the federal troops that had sustained Reconstruction governments were withdrawn, and in the years that followed, Southern legislatures began to replace informal separation practices and company rules with state laws.

Sarah: Meanwhile, the Supreme Court was steadily narrowing the reach of the new Reconstruction amendments. The first cases that made it to the US Supreme Court dealing with the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment are known as the Slaughterhouse Cases. At question was the constitutionality of an 1869 Louisiana law that incorporated the Crescent City Livestock Landing & Slaughterhouse Company and granted it the exclusive right to butcher livestock in the city of New Orleans. On its surface, the law was supposed to protect public health by reducing the amount of waste created by the mass slaughter of animals in the butchering industry. In actuality, state legislators had been bribed outright by the City Livestock Landing & Slaughterhouse Company to be awarded the sole right to operate in the city. 

Elizabeth: The Butchers Benevolent Association, a group of butchers who had been left out of the corporation, filed suit in federal court. The butchers claimed that by denying them the “property” right to practice their livelihood without state interference Louisiana had violated their rights under the Thirteenth Amendment. Also, they claimed that by creating a monopoly that favored some citizens at the cost of others, Louisiana had violated their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment as well. A consolidation of several of these suits came to be known as the Slaughterhouse Cases and reached the US Supreme Court in 1873. A 5-4 majority ruled in favor of the state of Louisiana and against the butchers. Justice Samuel Miller wrote the majority opinion and interpreted the five-year-old Fourteenth Amendment narrowly. He held that “the distinction between citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a state is clearly recognized and established” and that because the “privileges and immunities” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied only to the rights associated with “national citizenship” and not those of state citizenship, it did not prohibit the state of Louisiana from creating the butchering monopoly. What this reading of the law meant was that the Privileges and Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was made ineffectual.

Sarah: In Hall v. DeCuir in 1878, the Supreme Court struck down a Louisiana Reconstruction statute prohibiting racial discrimination on common carriers. Josephine DeCuir, a mixed-race Creole woman, was denied access to the first-class ladies’ cabin while traveling on the steamboat Governor Allen between New Orleans and Hermitage, Louisiana. She sued, under the grounds of a Louisiana Act of February 23, 1869, which required common carriers to provide equal rights and privileges to all passengers regardless of race or color. She initially won her case but when it was appealed and brought before the U.S. Supreme Court, her win was overturned and the court decided in favor of the steamboat business, arguing that because the steamboat traveled across state lines (between Louisiana and Mississippi), its operations constituted interstate commerce. And regulating commerce across state lines and navigable waterways belongs exclusively to Congress under the commerce clause. 

Elizabeth: In the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, the Supreme Court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited racial discrimination in inns, public conveyances, and places of amusement, exceeded Congress’s authority, because the Fourteenth Amendment reached only the actions of states and not those of private individuals. That same year Ida B. Wells was forcibly thrown off a first-class train car. Wells is best known for the campaign against lynching that she began in the 1890s and carried to audiences across the Northern United States and Great Britain. Less well known is that, like Mary Miles, she refused to leave the white car on a railroad, in her case on a Tennessee line. This happened to her twice. She brought two lawsuits, won both in the lower courts, and lost when the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the judgments in 1887. Her case, Chesapeake, Ohio and Southwestern Railroad Company v. Wells, also appears among the state decisions cited in the Plessy majority opinion as upholding separation. Wells shortly thereafter turned to investigative journalism, producing one of the strongest anti-lynching platforms in the United States. 

Sarah: The Plessy case came out of New Orleans, a city unlike any other in the United States. When the United States took possession of Louisiana in 1803, there already existed in New Orleans a community of some six thousand free people of color. Many were of mixed ancestry, French- or Spanish-speaking, Catholic, and in many cases property owners. Some had served in the colonial militia and bore arms. The treaty by which the United States acquired Louisiana had promised the inhabitants of the territory the rights of citizens of the United States, and the free people of color of New Orleans understood that promise to include them.

Elizabeth: The U.S. appointed governor William C.C. Claiborne wrote to Secretary of State James Madison and to President Thomas Jefferson asking for guidance about this armed and organized population whose loyalty to the new government he could not take for granted. A letter took about a month to reach Washington and another month for a reply to return, and the reply left Claiborne to manage the situation as best he could. Claiborne concluded that he could not safely disband the free colored militia and that he needed its support. Over the following decades, successive generations of free people of color in New Orleans preserved the memory of the promises made to them. They remembered 1803. They remembered 1814 and 1815, when Andrew Jackson recruited free men of color to help defend New Orleans against the British and promised them recognition. They remembered the arrival of Union forces in 1862, when the federal occupation of the city brought new promises. In 1864, the community sent two delegates to Washington to meet with President Lincoln to press for Black voting rights. 

Sarah: In 1867, the same year that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Mary Miles’s case, New Orleans experienced its own confrontation over streetcars. The city’s mule-drawn streetcars were divided into cars for white passengers and cars marked with a star for Black passengers. Black riders had to wait for the star cars, which ran less frequently. White riders faced no such restrictions and when the white cars were crowded, white passengers took over the star cars as well. The resulting protests included a deliberate act of civil disobedience by a man named William Nichols, who boarded a car reserved for white passengers, refused to leave, and sought arrest in order to bring the matter before a court. Others did the same. The New Orleans streetcar protests of 1867 succeeded in opening the cars, and Louisiana’s Reconstruction constitution of 1868 guaranteed equal access to public accommodations.

Elizabeth: Those guarantees did not survive the end of Reconstruction. The Supreme Court’s decision in Hall v. DeCuir undermined Louisiana’s equal-access statute as applied to interstate carriers, and after April 1877 white Democrats regained control of the state government. In July 1890, the Louisiana legislature enacted the Separate Car Act. The law required railroads operating in the state to provide “equal but separate accommodations for the “white, and colored races,” either by furnishing separate coaches or by dividing coaches with a partition. It made it a crime for a passenger to insist on occupying a coach assigned to the other race, and it authorized railroad officers to assign passengers to cars according to their race. 

Sarah: In 1891, a group of activists in New Orleans organized as the Comité des Citoyens, or the Citizens’ Committee to test the constitutionality of the Separate Car Law. Its leading figure was Louis A. Martinet, a lawyer, physician, and the publisher of the Black, Republican newspaper New Orleans Crusader. Many staff members of the New Orleans Crusader, were among the group’s members, including writer Rodolphe Desdunes, and managing editor L. J. Joubert, who served as president of the Justice, Protective, Educational, and Social Club at the same time that Homer Plessy was its vice president. In 1883, Martinet had been a delegate from Louisiana to the National Convention of Colored Men in Louisville, Kentucky. At that meeting Frederick Douglass addressed the convention and urged Black Americans not to wait any longer for their rights but to act. So, Martinet had been an activist for a while.

Elizabeth: The Comité raised funds, retained counsel, and planned a test case. It secured Albion W. Tourgée, a white former Union officer and Reconstruction-era judge was its lead lawyer. By the 1890s, Tourgée was the most prominent white advocate for Black civil rights in the country. He was also a best-selling novelist whose fiction dealt with Reconstruction, and he wrote a widely read column in the Chicago Inter Ocean under the title “A Bystander’s Notes.” Tourgée used the column to argue that Northerners misunderstood the South, that conditions there were worse than they supposed, and that the North bore responsibility for standing by while lynching spread. Tourgée agreed to take the case pro bono, and he worked alongside a local New Orleans attorney, James C. Walker.

The Weekly Times-Picayune·New Orleans, LA, 17 Apr 1896

Sarah: The Comité’s first test did not produce the case it wanted. In early 1892, Daniel Desdunes, the son of Comité member Rodolphe Desdunes, was arrested after taking a seat in a white car on a train bound for another state. Because the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled in a separate case that the Separate Car Act could not constitutionally be applied to interstate passengers, the prosecution of Desdunes was dropped. That outcome was a partial victory, but it left intrastate separation intact, and the Comité needed a passenger traveling entirely within Louisiana.

Elizabeth: Homer Adolph Plessy, a thirty-year-old shoemaker who was born free in New Orleans  was a volunteer recruited by the committee, because he was a respected member of the community but also because he was fair-skinned enough to cause confusion about his race. The lawyers wanted to argue, among other things, that a law requiring the separation of the races was unworkable and arbitrary when a conductor could not reliably determine a passenger’s race just by looking at them.

Sarah: On June 7, 1892, Plessy bought a first-class ticket on the East Louisiana Railroad for a trip from New Orleans to Covington, Louisiana, a town across Lake Pontchartrain. He took a seat in the car reserved for white passengers. The train’s conductor, J. J. Dowling, who was in on the test case’s planning, came to collect Plessy’s ticket. Accounts differ as to what was actually said, but it was something along the lines of Plessy telling the conductor he was not white, even though he presented so. Dowling then told Plessy to leave the “whites only” car, Plessy did not, and was arrested by a detective who was also prepared in advance to be present. The entire arrest was planned with the cooperation of the railroad, which opposed a law that required it to purchase and operate additional cars.

Elizabeth: Plessy’s lawyers moved to dismiss the charge on the ground that the Separate Car Act violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Judge John Howard Ferguson of the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans denied the motion. The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld Ferguson’s ruling in December 1892, and Plessy’s lawyers sought review in the Supreme Court of the United States. The case was named Plessy v. Ferguson because Plessy sought a writ against the original judge presiding over the prosecution. The Supreme Court did not hear arguments until April 1896, more than three and a half years after Plessy’s arrest. The delay was not entirely unwelcome to Tourgée. He was aware that the Supreme Court, as then composed, was unlikely to rule in Plessy’s favor and he hoped that a shift in public opinion, or in the membership of the Court, might improve the case’s prospects. Neither of those scenarios occurred.

Sarah: Tourgée’s legal brief advanced a range of arguments, some rooted in the Thirteenth Amendment, contending that the separation law imposed a badge of servitude. Other arguments were grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of citizenship, due process, and equal protection. His brief also contained a sentence some of you may have heard before: “Justice is pictured blind and her daughter, the Law, ought at least to be color-blind.”[6]

Elizabeth: Tourgée crafted an argument designed for a Court whose members were zealous protectors of property rights. He argued that a person’s reputation was a form of property. Tourgee argued that in a society in which being regarded as white carried substantial social and economic value, a man who could be taken for white possessed something of value, and the state could not deprive him of it without due process of law. Yet the Separate Car Act gave that power to a conductor walking down the aisle of a railroad car and allowed him in these cases to act as police officer, judge, and sentencing authority by determining a passenger’s race and consigning him to the non-whitecar.[7]That argument didn’t work. 

Sarah: The Court that ultimately decided Plessy v Ferguson consisted of Chief Justice Melville Fuller and Justices Stephen Field, John Marshall Harlan, Horace Gray, David Brewer, Henry Billings Brown, George Shiras, Edward Douglass White, and Rufus Peckham. Justice Brewer did not participate in the decision because he left Washington to attend to the unexpected death of his daughter in Kansas, on the day the case was argued. That’s why the vote was seven to one rather than a full nine-member vote. But Brewer was also ideologically aligned with the majority anyway, so it most likely wouldn’t have made much of a difference. Six of the seven justices in the majority came from Northern families. The only dissenter was the one justice who had been born into a slaveholding family.

Elizabeth: In his book Separate, Luxenberg creates a narrative around the contrasting lives of the author of the majority opinion in Plessy, Henry Billings Brown, and the author of the lone dissent, John Marshall Harlan. The two men were close contemporaries, and their early careers ran on nearly parallel tracks before diverging in unexpected ways. Henry Billings Brown was born in 1836 in western Massachusetts, grew up in Connecticut, and was educated at Yale. In 1859 he moved to Michigan to begin a legal career in Detroit. He came of age in a region with a strong antislavery culture. Brown became a federal district judge in Detroit, specializing in admiralty law, and was appointed to the Supreme Court by President Benjamin Harrison in 1890. He had served on the Court about six years when Plessy came before it. 

Sarah: John Marshall Harlan was born in 1833 in Kentucky to a slaveholding family. In 1859, the same year that Brown moved to Detroit, Harlan ran for Congress and campaigned as a supporter of slavery. When the Civil War came, Harlan remained loyal to the Union. He raised a regiment and served as its colonel, leading Kentuckians against Confederate forces that included other Kentuckians and Tennesseans. Harlan wrote an open letter stating that he would not fight in a war to end slavery, but his father’s death led him to resign his commission before the end of the war. He became Kentucky’s attorney general after the war and opposed the Reconstruction amendments on the ground that they stripped powers from the states.

Elizabeth: Harlan’s position changed over the following decade. In 1868 he joined the Republican Party, partly because of his revulsion at a Democratic Party whose ranks were filled with former Confederates, whom he viewed as traitors to the nation he loved. He formed a close alliance with Benjamin Bristow, a fellow Kentuckian who served as the United States attorney in Kentucky, prosecuting violence against Black Kentuckians under federal civil rights law, and who later became the first Solicitor General of the United States and then Secretary of the Treasury. Bristow was way more radical than Harlan. When Bristow sought the Republican presidential nomination in 1876, Harlan served as his campaign manager. Harlan obviously changed during the course of his adult life, perhaps because of Bristow’s influence, or perhaps because of the collective experiences of war and Reconstruction. President Rutherford B. Hayes appointed Harlan to the Supreme Court in 1877, three years before Brown was appointed.

Sarah: Henry Billings Brown’s majority opinion, delivered on May 18, 1896, disposed of the Thirteenth Amendment argument quickly. A statute that merely implied a legal distinction between the races, Brown wrote, had no tendency to reestablish slavery or involuntary servitude. The substance of the opinion concerned the Fourteenth Amendment, and Brown’s reading of it was narrow:

The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.[8]

Elizabeth: The distinction between political equality, which the amendment protected, and social equality, which Brown held it did not reach, carried much of the opinion’s weight. To support the proposition that laws requiring separation were compatible with the amendment, Brown turned to legal precedents including Roberts v. City of Bostonand, on the specific question of separation in public conveyances, the Pennsylvania decision in Miles.

Sarah: The test Brown ultimately applied was one of reasonableness. The question was whether the Louisiana statute was a reasonable exercise of the state’s police power, and in answering it, Brown wrote, the legislature “is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs, and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order.”[9] By that standard, he saw nothing unreasonable in the law. The Court declined to engage with the Fourteenth Amendment arguments as Plessy’s lawyers had framed them, and decided the case as a matter of state police power to preserve law and order, reminiscent of Daniel Agnew’s opinion in the Miles case, three decades earlier.

Elizabeth: Brown addressed the argument that separation marked Black Americans as inferior, and his answer closely paralleled Agnew’s assurance that separateness did not imply inferiority:

We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.[10]

He added that legislation was “powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences,” and that “if one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane.”[11]

Elizabeth: Brown also answered Tourgée’s property argument. If Plessy was a white man assigned to a coach for Black people, Brown wrote, he might have an action for damages against the railroad for depriving him of his reputation. But if he was a Black man, he had been deprived of no property, because he was “not lawfully entitled to the reputation of being a white man.”[12] Brown concluded that the question of how Plessy’s race was to be determined was a matter for the laws of each state.

Sarah: Harlan’s dissent took the opposite view on nearly every point. He rejected the idea that the purpose of the Louisiana law was obscure or benign:

Every one knows that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons.[13]

Elizabeth: Harlan described the promise of equal accommodations as a “thin disguise” that would “not mislead any one, nor atone for the wrong this day done.” And in the passage for which the dissent is best remembered, he wrote:

“But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”

Harlan also predicted how the decision would be regarded by later generations:

“In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott case.”

Sarah: However, Harlan was also a privileged white male of his time and his language about Chinese immigrants reflected the prevailing exclusionist attitudes of the period. Harlan used xenophobic language, describing Chinese people as “a race so distinct from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States.”[14] He argued it was absurd that a group viewed as entirely foreign could enjoy privileges denied to loyal Black citizens. The sentence immediately preceding his declaration that there is no caste in America asserts that the white race regards itself as the dominant race in the country, and that it would continue to be so for all time if it remained true to its heritage. 

Elizabeth: What is surprising to us looking back is that the Plessy case got little attention outside of the Black press. Or maybe we shouldn’t be that surprised. The Court had already laid out its narrow reading of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Slaughter-House Cases, the Civil Rights Cases, and the Mississippi railroad case, and Plessy appeared to many observers as a continuation of that line of decisions rather than a departure from it.

Sarah: For Homer Plessy, the case ended quietly. In January 1897 he appeared before Judge Ferguson, changed his plea to guilty, and paid a fine of twenty-five dollars instead of spending twenty nights in jail. The Comité des Citoyens disbanded that same year, publishing a statement that it had done what it could and that the fight would have to be carried forward by others. Plessy and his wife lived the rest of his life in the Faubourg Tremé neighborhood of New Orleans and died in 1925. He was interred in the Saint Louis Cemetery No. 1 in New Orleans, Louisiana. There is a large bronze plaque on his mausoleum. 

Elizabeth: The immediate consequences of Plessy were substantial. In the years after 1896, Southern states extended separation by statute across nearly every area of public life: waiting rooms, streetcars, schools, hospitals, parks, theaters, restaurants, even cemeteries. At the same time, they continued to strip Black men of the vote through poll taxes, literacy tests, and grandfather clauses. Louisiana adopted a new constitution in 1898 with provisions designed to disfranchise Black voters, and the Supreme Court, in Williams v. Mississippi in 1898, declined to strike down Mississippi’s comparable scheme. In Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education in 1899, the Court declined to intervene when a Georgia county closed its only Black public high school while continuing to fund a high school for white students. In Berea College v. Kentucky in 1908, the Court upheld a state law prohibiting even a private college from educating Black and white students together. And in Gong Lum v. Rice in 1927, it upheld Mississippi’s exclusion of a Chinese American girl from a white public school, treating the principle of separation in public education as settled.

Homer Plessy’s family mausoleum

Sarah: The “equal” portion of the formula was, in practice, rarely enforced. Public expenditures on Black schools across the South were a fraction of those on white schools, and the separate railroad cars, waiting rooms, and other facilities provided to Black Southerners were generally inferior. 

Elizabeth: The legal campaign that eventually undid Plessy was built slowly, and largely by Black lawyers. Beginning in the 1930s, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, under the leadership of Charles Hamilton Houston and later Thurgood Marshall, pursued a deliberate strategy of challenging segregation in graduate and professional education, where the inequality of separate facilities was easiest to demonstrate and the political stakes were lower than in primary schools. In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada in 1938, the Supreme Court held that Missouri could not satisfy its obligations by paying for a Black student to attend law school in another state. In 1950, in Sweatt v. Painter and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, the Court held that separate facilities for Black students in legal and graduate education were unequal in ways that could not be remedied by physical parity alone, because they denied Black students access to the intangible elements of professional education. Mendez v Westminster was the first time in federal court that plaintiffs succeeded in forbidding segregation using the argument that separate was not equal, but that case didn’t make it to the Supreme Court. 

Sarah: On May 17, 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, a unanimous Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren held that racial segregation in public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Warren wrote “We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”[15] Brown was, in effect, a declaration that Plessy had been wrongly decided, at least as applied to schools. The Supreme Court in 1954 needed to be clear, unambiguous, and unanimous. By characterizing Plessy as the source of a doctrine, the Court was describing the practical effect of the 1896 decision, and it was clearing the ground for its own ruling without equivocation. Over the following years, the Court extended that principle to other areas of public life, including, in Gayle v. Browder in 1956, desegregated buses in Montgomery, Alabama.

Elizabeth: It’s important to remember that the Supreme Court did not make segregation the law of the land. What the decision in Plessy v. Ferguson did was affirm that states could require racial separation if they chose to, and in doing so it opened the door for other states to make similar laws. The choice to enact segregation laws was made by legislatures, and the people who voted for them. That’s an important thought to remember going forward. We may not like decisions that the Supreme Court makes, back then or today, but the court is making decisions based on laws written and passed by legislators that we elect. You, me, your neighbor, your dad- we are the people who vote for these leaders who make these laws. So, if you don’t like your leaders and the laws they are making, go vote!

Further Reading:

Elliott, Mark. Color Blind Justice : Albion Tourgée and the Quest for Racial Equality from the Civil War to Plessy V. Ferguson. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 

Graham, Barbara L. “Conclusion.” In Supreme Court Policymaking and Race: Origins and Development. State University of New York Press, 2026.

Hoffer, Williamjames Hull. Plessy v. Ferguson: Race and Inequality in Jim Crow America. University Press of Kansas, 2012.

Kelley, Blair Murphy. Right to Ride : Streetcar Boycotts and African American Citizenship in the Era of Plessy v. Ferguson. 1st ed. University of North Carolina Press, 2010.

Luxenberg, Steve. Separate: The Story of Plessy v. Ferguson, and America’s Journey from Slavery to Segregation. W. W. Norton, 2019.

Medley, Keith Weldon. We as Freemen : Plessy v. Ferguson.Pelican Pub. Co., 2003.

O’Brien, David M., Constitutional Law and Politics: Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011).


Notes

[1] Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 163 U.S. 537 

[2] New York Times, May 18, 1865, p. 5

[3] West Chester and Philadelphia Railroad Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209 (Pa. 1867)

[4] West Chester and Philadelphia Railroad Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209 (Pa. 1867)

[5] West Chester and Philadelphia Railroad Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209 (Pa. 1867)

[6] Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 163 U.S. 537 

[7] Mark Elliot, Color Blind Justice : Albion Tourgée and the Quest for Racial Equality from the Civil War to Plessy V. Ferguson, 332. 

[8] Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 163 U.S. 537 

[9] Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 163 U.S. 537 

[10] Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 163 U.S. 537 

[11] Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 163 U.S. 537 

[12] Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 163 U.S. 537 

[13] Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 163 U.S. 537 

[14] Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 163 U.S. 537 

[15] Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)


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